Civil War on the Egyptian Horizon

Global News Blog / IPS

Mel Frykberg

CAIRO, Dic 14 (IPS) – Egypt is facing its worst political crisis since the January 2011 revolution ousted former dictator Hosni Mubarak, with analysts warning of a possible civil war. Furthermore, unlike during the revolution, opposition to the current regime is bitterly divided between Islamists and more secular Egyptians.The inability of Muslim Brotherhood (MB) supporters and their Islamist allies to find common ground with opponents of President Mohamed Mursi is exacerbated by deep divisions within the revolutionary opposition as they struggle to formulate a strategy forward. Another crucial factor is the uncertain role of Egypt’s military in forthcoming political developments

“Egypt is in for a protracted and prolonged political struggle ahead. The current situation is untenable. It looks like we could be heading towards civil war. The wild card on the table is the military, as it is uncertain which side it will take,” Gamal Nkrumah, a political analyst and the international affairs editor at Egypt’s Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper, told IPS.

Weeks of protest, sparked by a Nov. 22 decree issued by Mursi which would have granted him sweeping powers beyond judiciary mediation, forced the Brotherhood-affiliated Mursi to cancel the decree on Dec. 7 after the violence, which inflamed Egyptian cities and towns, threatened to spiral out of control.

However, a new modified decree will still afford the president enormous powers with minimal judicial oversight. Furthermore, Mursi’s decision to rush through a referendum on an Islamist-dominated constitution on Dec. 15, despite limited consultation with minority groups, including Coptic Christians, women and liberal politicians, has further enraged the opposition.

“Four of Mursi’s non-Islamist advisors resigned after they tried to persuade him to be more inclusive with the new constitution. They even postponed their resignation for a week, but when Mursi showed no signs of backing down they eventually left,” Nkrumah said.

Bloody street battles between MB supporters and revolutionary opposition members culminated in the deaths of at least seven people, and hundreds were arrested and wounded, as the presidential palace was stormed by opposition members over the weekend of Dec. 8-9 despite the presence of tanks and revolutionary guards. Six people were killed in previous weeks of violence.

During the bloody nights and days of fighting, journalists and doctors were assaulted and shot at, resulting in the death of a doctor and a reporter left with serious brain damage. The role of Egypt’s military was brought into question, with some reports of soldiers siding with Brotherhood members and others of military members sympathising and encouraging the revolutionaries.

So far the military has officially stayed on the sidelines. But on Saturday Dec. 8 it issued a statement warning of impending action if the warring factions failed to resolve their differences through dialogue.

"Anything other than dialogue will force us into a dark tunnel with disastrous consequences. The nation as a whole will pay the price, something which we won’t allow," the statement said.

“Which way the military dice will fall is the big question,” said Nkrumah, the son of Ghana’s late president Kwame Nkrumah and an Egyptian Coptic mother.

“While high-ranking military officers traditionally sided with the former regime of Mubarak, it is uncertain where the loyalty of the second tier of the army now lies and how far their ranks have been infiltrated by the Brotherhood. Many of the poorer, less educated lower-ranking soldiers are probably MB sympathisers.”

Another part of the equation is whether the powerful judiciary will throw its weight behind the Islamists or behind the revolutionaries, although indications so far are that it is hostile to Mursi’s government.

“Traditionally many in the judiciary were also supporters of Mubarak. But like the military, both institutions have been infiltrated by the MB and both sides have their sympathisers,” Nkrumah said.

What does appear certain, however, is that neither the Muslim Brotherhood nor their opponents are prepared to compromise.

“The Brotherhood is consolidating its power on the ground with the Salafists. They believe they have God on their side and are fighting for the survival of and further implementation of Sharia law,” Nkrumah said.

For their part, the secular parties, unlike the Islamists, have limited electoral support, no message with widespread appeal and no apparatus to reach deeply into society in order to drum up support.

“They have been weak and divided in the past and it remains to be seen whether they can unite, put their differences aside and formulate a path ahead,” Nkrumah added.

“The standoff is the unavoidable consequence of a struggle for power between two political forces that have no incentive to compete in the same political arena on the basis of accepted rules of the game,” says Marina Ottaway, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“One side (MB) fights through the vote, and the other (pro-Mubarak elite) through the courts—and both appeal to the streets to bypass the official political process,” she wrote in a late November article, “A Choice of Two Tyrannies”.

“The confrontation increasingly is taking on the character of a Greek tragedy, with Egypt hurtling toward authoritarianism no matter which side prevails. The only question is whether it will be the tyranny of the Islamist majority or that of the secular minority.

“Either way, the prospects for a democratic denouement to the uprising…are dim—non-existent in the short-run and questionable at best in the medium-run, with the long run too distant to hazard predictions.”

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.

Washington Struggles for Relevance as Assad’s Fall Approaches

Global News Blog / IPS

Samer Araabi

WASHINGTON, Dic 14 (IPS) – This week, the United States officially recognised the newly-formed National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people, culminating a two-year process of legitimising the Syrian opposition with the U.S. government.However, as rebels advance ever-closer to the regime’s remaining centres of power, Washington may soon be forced to make more controversial decisions that influence its relations with the Syrian state – and possibly the entire region – for decades to come.

“Those who wish to influence and shape (the outcome of the conflict) must get into the arena,” said Ambassador Frederic C. Hof, senior fellow for the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, at a roundtable discussion on Syria Wednesday.

Hof warned that, “Whether the regime goes voluntarily or at the point of the gun, one thing is clear. Those who fought the regime with arms will have much to say” in determining Syria’s future, “even if a civilian government comes to power.”

But further militarising an already explosive situation may have long-term consequences beyond the current battle between opposition forces and the Syrian regime.

Spontaneous Civil Society

At a panel discussion at the New America Foundation on Tuesday, Mohammed A. Ghanem, senior policy advisor for the Syrian American Council, spoke about the development on independent civil society in “liberated” regions in northern Syria.

“Citizens are coming together trying to fill the gap left by the contracting state,” said Ghanem, describing the proliferation of local city councils and proto-government groups that have formed in the wake of the regime’s departure.

But such civil society groups can only exist in the shadow of the armed rebel forces that have driven out existing institutions. “Of course if it were not for the military efforts in the city, there would be no liberated areas,” says Ghanem. “Everyone depends on the (Free Syrian Army) to provide protection and keep the regime from entering the city.”

“However,” he warns, “there is also a competitive aspect…about who will have the upper hand in the city. Both the military council and the civilians are severely underfunded, but the main source of power for the military is in fighters and arms, whereas civilians need to be empowered to provide more and more services so their legitimacy will be bolstered.”

Very little international attention or money has been given to these grassroots efforts; most of the money funneled into the country has been devoted to maintaining the salaries and supplies of rebel groups.

The tension between the civilian and military opposition to Assad’s rule, long simmering since the conflict took a decidedly militaristic turn last year, raises problems for Washington’s attempts to influence a post-Assad transitional order.

Washington’s Catch-22

The Obama administration has largely avoided direct influence in the fighting on the ground. Instead, it has sought to facilitate the transfer of arms and intelligence to “friendly” armed groups in Syria.

“Although Washington has quietly endorsed the new regional Sunni politics, U.S. policymakers and intelligence and policy analysts should consider the possibility that in the long run, the new order could also spell trouble for Arab democratic transitions and for the West,” wrote Emile Nakhleh, the former director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Programme at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The administration quickly found that far-right Islamists and Al-Qaeda sympathisers were among the best-armed and well-financed armed groups, and that U.S. equivocation has engendered animosity from both the regime and the opposition.

Many have argued that the absence of pro-U.S. sentiment in Syria necessitates a more direct involvement. Ghanem stated that “engaging the situation, being proactive about what’s happening, and doing it before it’s too late…will determine the relationship they have (with Syria) in the future.”

He dismissed concerns that direct support might empower the wrong individuals. “This argument of ‘we don’t know the bad guys and the good guys’, I don’t buy that. They know who’s good and who’s bad. What they need to do is to engage the situation more proactively.”

Similarly, at the Atlantic Council roundtable, Ambassador Hof cautioned that “to be credible with Syrians…the United States will have to become directly involved in arming units now affiliated with the new opposition Supreme Military Council,” referring to the Free Syrian Army’s new military coordination body.

However, given its diminished regional standing, any overture of support (or condemnation) from Washington may well have the opposite of its intended effect.

Activists have accused Washington of “putting the opposition in a very embarrassing position” by listing the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front as a foreign terrorist organisation earlier this week. Some have argued that Nusra’s portrayal as an enemy of Western interests in Syria has bolstered its legitimacy, not undermined it.

Ambassador Hof acknowledged the problem, but characterised the terrorist designation as a U.S. policy imperative. “I understand the reaction of the Syrian opposition, but the Syrian opposition needs to understand that we’re not going to be forgetting about 9/11 and Benghazi any time soon.”

Others, including Sheikh Moaz Al-Khatib, head of the National Coalition, and Riyadh Al-Asad, commander of the Free Syrian Army, have defended the Nusra Front as “integral to the fight", and its militants among “the best and the bravest” of the Syrian opposition.

After the Fall

Given these limitations, the administration has been happy to project an image of staying on the sidelines, but even if the regime falls – a process that could take days or months – calls for international intervention are unlikely to subside.

Hof argues that “an international stabilisation military force” will be necessary to “return refugees and …restore vital services as quickly as possible", referencing the growing humanitarian disaster for displaced individuals in Syria and refugees abroad.

While the war grinds on, hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees are bracing for the coming winter. Though most did not expect to remain outside their country long enough to consider the coming weather, it appears that few are expecting to return home any time soon.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.

For Palestinian Workers, the Enemy Is the Hope

Global News Blog / IPS

Jillian Kestler-DAmours

RAMALLAH, Occupied West Bank, Sep 25 (IPS) – Hassan Hader’s application for a permit to work in Israel has been rejected four times. Now waiting to hear back from the Israeli authorities on his latest attempt, the 52-year-old father of five said he has no choice but to keep applying.“I wasn’t even given a reason why my application was rejected,” said Hader, who worked at a quarry in the industrial zone of Ma’ale Adumim, one of Israel’s largest illegal West Bank settlements, for nearly 20 years before losing his job last year.

Hader lives in Ramallah and holds a West Bank-only ID card. He told IPS that he has no viable job opportunities in the Palestinian labour market. With his family’s savings slowly running out after over a year without work, he said that getting a permit to work in Israel is his only option.

“I’m tired,” he said. “It’s not a good situation.”

Recently, local media reported that the Israeli government plans to increase the number of work permits allocated to Palestinian labourers from the West Bank. In an e-mail to IPS, Barak Granot, spokesperson for the Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labour, confirmed that an additional 5,000 permits would be issued to Palestinians to work in the Israeli construction industry.

“The increase was decided in order to assist and ease the stress and lack of employment in the West Bank on one hand, and to ease the shortage of workers in the Israeli construction sector on the other hand. This decision was made according to the government policy to favour Palestinian workers, rather than other foreign workers,” Granot stated.

The Israeli Civil Administration (ICA), the Israeli military body that controls over 60 percent of the occupied West Bank, echoed this sentiment. “The increase in permit granting is supposed to reduce the activity of the foreign workers who stay in Israel for long periods, and might settle here. As opposed to them, Palestinians arrive in Israel (during the) day and usually leave in the evening,” the ICA told IPS in an e-mailed statement.

As Israel imposed restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement after the outbreak of the second Intifadah (Palestinian uprising), migrant workers from the Philippines, China, Thailand and Eastern Europe, among other areas, gradually replaced the Palestinian workforce.

Recently, however, an influx of migrant workers and asylum seekers in Israel has caused panic among Israeli leaders, who say the presence of non-Jewish foreigners threatens the country’s Jewish character.

In response, the government has decided to gradually lower its quota of work permits for foreign workers, and has placed more limits on these workers’ freedoms once in the country, including binding caregivers to their employers and to specific places in Israel.

The Israeli Civil Administration told IPS that there are currently 57,095 Palestinian workers employed in Israel and in Israeli settlements, and that permits for 8,000 more Palestinian workers would soon be approved, in addition to the 5,000 extra permits for construction workers.

Palestinians must be over 26 years old, married, and must pass a security check to be eligible for the permits, the ICA stated.

According to an April 2012 World Bank report titled ‘Towards Economic Sustainability of a Future Palestinian state’, between 2000-2004 the number of Palestinians working in the Israeli labour market fell from 26 percent to less than 12 percent. In 2010, approximately 14 percent of the West Bank workforce was employed in Israel or in Israeli settlements.

Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip, however, have been barred from entering Israel or the West Bank for work since 2006. Israel also stops almost all Palestinian products from being exported from the Gaza Strip.

“Gaza is undergoing a process of de-development where the economy is being dismantled. It’s an economy that is not allowed to be productive. Certainly allowing workers in Gaza to return to their jobs in Israel would provide a boost of hard-earned income to families who need it desperately,” said Sari Bashi, director of Gisha, the Israeli legal centre for freedom of movement.

According to the United Nations, the unemployment rate in the occupied Palestinian territories was 26 percent in 2011. Unemployment among youth, aged 15-29, was even higher, sitting at 35 percent and 53 percent in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, respectively.

“There needs to be recognition that Israel has obligations to those that are under occupation and who are trying to make a living,” Bashi told IPS.

Gisha estimates that approximately 60,000 Palestinians from the West Bank – half with permits, half without – enter Israel every day for work. A better-regulated system could reduce the risks involved for Palestinian labourers who enter Israel illegally, Bashi added.

In late July, a Palestinian man was killed and three others were wounded when Israeli soldiers manning a Jerusalem-area checkpoint opened fire at their car which was carrying over a dozen Palestinian workers trying to enter Israel without permits.

“I am sure that it will not be the last incident and it’s not the first against Palestinian workers,” Shawan Jabarin, director of Palestinian human rights organisation Al Haq told IPS. “Most of the people have no salaries. They just want money to feed their families.”

Hassan Hader knows people who enter Israel illegally for work, but the consequences of getting caught – both for himself and for his family – deter him from even trying.

“It’s too risky to go into Israel without a permit,” he said. “I want to go through the door, not through the window.”

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.

Child Abuse on the Rise in Bahrain

Global News Blog / IPS

Suad Hamada

MANAMA, Sep 25 (IPS) – A thirty-four-year-old Bahraini teacher, whose son was abused five years ago, has hitherto refused to tell anyone the story, afraid that she will be blamed for failing to protect her child who is now eight years old.“He was sitting with the maid outside the house. She left him alone for a moment to fetch some milk and some teenagers took him to a building under construction in the area,” the teacher told IPS, requesting anonymity.

“When she found him missing, she searched for him and found him being harassed by those boys.”

"I couldn’t report the case as they (the boys) are my neighbours and I don’t want people to blame me or to a shame my son when he grows up," she said, expressing the sentiment of countless families.

The teacher didn’t take the child to a physician and stopped his counseling when she was advised to take legal action against the perpetrators.

Sexual abuse of children in Bahrain is increasingly sneaking under the radar, as families anxious to avoid ‘disgracing’ themselves in the conservative society keep silent about the issue.

Others keep the matter top secret out of fear of legal action against abusers, who are very often family relations.

Former head of the state-run Children Protection Centre (CPC), Dr. Fakhriya Dairi, told IPS, "As a government organisation we receive calls from neighbours or close relatives who report abuse cases with anonymity.

“In some cases we manage to prove the abuse but other times parents succeed in hiding the truth," she said.

Activists and lawyers, however, criticise lenient punishments and the lack of special legislation to tackle child abuse.

Legal protections needed

Dr. Sharifa Swar, head of Batelco Care Centre for Family Violence Cases, has noticed an increase in sexual abuse cases with an average of three reported to the centre every week.

The centre registered 408 abuse cases in 2011, including cases of violence against women. To date, Bahrain has not conducted a comprehensive study on child abuse, so very few official statistics exist.

Swar told the press earlier this month that the increase in reported cases does not mean the end of social misconceptions and stigmas. In fact, she is convinced that the reported cases conceal a much larger number of victims, who are simply too afraid to speak up.

"We need tough legislation to protect children as the current (laws) are outdated and could help abusers escape punishment," she said in a statement published earlier this month.

Under existing legislation, an adult who sexually abuses a child below 12 years of age is punished with up to fifteen years’ imprisonment, or nine years in jail if the victim is older.

But social activist and lawyer Fawziya Janahi pointed out that many abusers escape such punishment. She cited a recent case in which a court sentenced a 25-year-old man to a single year in jail for raping Janahi’s 16-year-old female client, by convincing the court that the girl agreed to have sex with him.

"I’m still battling another case of a 14-year-old girl who got pregnant after she was raped by four men. Only one confessed and he, too, might escape penalty for agreeing to marry her,” Janahi told IPS. “(Faulty) laws and social misconceptions turn the agony of sexual abuse into a lifetime of suffering.”

According to Janahi, Bahrain needs tougher punishments for child abusers, which could be put in place through an amendment of the penal code.

“The domestic violence draft law that is being reviewed by legislators could protect the rights of abused children, as parents who hide cases could be held responsible for neglect and maltreatment,” she said.

Additionally, the Be-Free Centre, dedicated to ensuring a safe living environment for children, has drafted a code of ethics to promote child rights.

This document enables government agencies, non-governmental organisations, the media, telecommunications establishments and many others to consider children’s safety when designing their strategies and services.

Members of civil society are currently holding negotiations with parliamentarians, in an effort to grant the draft code legal power.

The president of Be-Free Centre, Rana Al Sairafi, told IPS that 50 to 60 percent of all types of abuse against children go unreported.

"To reach out to families with abused children who don’t want their cases to be reported by NGOs or government organisations, we have launched a hotline that offers free counseling in anonymity," Al Sairafi added.

The centre also offers workshops to children of different age groups to train them on self-protection against abuse and exploitation.

Experts believe the issue has far-reaching social effects, which need to be tackled at a systemic level.

Swar said that males who were sexually abused in their childhood and didn’t receive proper therapy often lack concentration and suffer from short tempers.

"Sexually abused children hate to go to school and are emotionally unstable and shy,” she added.

Dairi, who recently started her own counseling centre, now receives fewer cases, which she attributes to financial constraints that prevent poor families from seeking therapy and psychological support.

The private counseling clinics charge an average of 50 dollars per session and the therapy could take more than one year.

This is often unaffordable for the 14,000 families who live below the poverty line, earning a monthly income of less than 370 Bahraini dinars (roughly 1,000 dollars).

Bahrain endorsed a child protection law this August, which forms a general framework for all aspects of child protection.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.

Libyan Islamists Cornered, Not Quietened

Global News Blog / IPS

Mel Frykberg

CAIRO, Sep 24 (IPS) – It could be premature to believe that the storming of Islamist militia bases by Benghazi citizens on Friday could spell the end for Libya’s Islamist militants. Just as it was premature to claim when moderate Libyan political parties took the majority of votes during the July elections that Libya had bucked the Islamist trend sweeping the region.Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi from the Middle East Forum says the election results should not lead to complacency. Attacks by Islamist fanatics have rocked Libya in the last few months, and show no signs of abating. Libya has also become a major exporter of both weapons and Salafist fighters to regional conflicts.

Fourteen people were left dead and more than 70 injured following the storming of militia bases Friday by Libyans angered by government inaction over continuing security chaos and over the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi. Many Libyans are fed up with Islamic fundamentalists threatening their hard-won revolution.

The Ansar Al Sharia militia base, which was set ablaze, was one of the main targets of Benghazi’s collective anger. Ansar Al Sharia members were allegedly behind the murder of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens.

Three other consular staff were also killed, during what is now believed to have been a pre-planned attack around the eleventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

Benghazi’s denizens have endured months of assassinations, kidnappings and bombings. Security in the city has continued to deteriorate since the revolution. The killing of the popular and charismatic Stevens was the final straw.

While secular Libyans rejoiced over the attacks on the militia, and international media coverage waxed lyrical about moderates having gained the upper hand, there are already disturbing signs following Friday night’s violent protests.

Several milita bases not associated with the extremists supposedly behind the storming of the consulate were also attacked, in another example of just how quickly indiscriminate violence can erupt in Libya.

Furthermore, on Saturday morning five soldiers with no ties to the extremist groups were found dead on the outskirts of Benghazi. They had bullet holes in their heads, and their hands were tied behind their backs. They appear to have been executed.

It is believed that members of militias targeted by the angry crowds carried out the killings of the soldiers, in one of the first acts of revenge. They accused members of the security forces of helping orchestrate the violent protests. There were also unconfirmed reports of several officers and non-commissioned officers being arrested by militia men. The Libyan government is now concerned about further reprisals.

An urgent cabinet meeting which started late Friday night and went on into the early hours of Saturday morning decided that all militias not sanctioned by the state would have two days to disband.

“The objective is to bring the militias under full control of the government,” said Ahmed Shalabi, official spokesman for Prime Minister-elect Mustafa Abushagur. “We want to see them inside the law, not outside of the law.”

But this may be easier to do on paper. Many milita members are said to be angry at their rejection after fighting for liberation of their country. This anger among thousands of unemployed, bitter and heavily armed militia, with an uncompromising ideology at odds with that of many other Libyans, is a recipe for unrest.

The inability of the government to unite the powerful militias has further destabilised the country. Some parliamentarians are afraid of a military confrontation with the powerful militias who are better equipped and often able to mobilise more rapidly than the weak and nascent police and army forces.

The Supreme Security Committee (SSC), an amalgamation of some militias and other security forces, has been heavily infiltrated by Salafist members. IPS witnessed members of the SSC blocking journalists from reporting on a group of Salafi gunmen destroying a Sufi mosque in Tripoli last month.

This was one of a number of attacks on Sufi mosques, graves and shrines in Libya. Some of the attackers are said to be serving members of the SSC.

The interior ministry has also come under scrutiny for its failure to provide better security for the U.S. consulate and the slow reaction of its members following the attack. Many believe that what the Islamists failed to achieve in the elections they are now trying to achieve on the ground.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.

New Generation of Arab Leaders to Address World Body

Global News Blog / IPS

Thalif Deen

UNITED NATIONS, Sep 21 (IPS) – When world leaders heading politically shaky authoritarian regimes lead their country’s delegations on overseas visits or attend international conferences, including the annual U.N. General Assembly sessions in September, there is always a lingering fear of either an insurrection or an attempted military coup back home.As far back as 1966, Ghana’s then-president Kwame Nkrumah was ousted from power when he was visiting China. And in March 1970, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia was dethroned – immediately after returning from visits to Moscow and Beijing – in a bloodless coup led by Lt. Gen. Lon Nol.

General Idi Amin overthrew the government of Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda when he was at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (CHOGM) in Singapore in January 1971.

But the CHOGM political curse did not stop there.

In June 1977, the President of Seychelles James Mancham was deposed in a coup while he was attending the London Commonwealth summit six years later.

And most recently, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted in a military coup 24 hours before he was to address the General Assembly sessions in September 2006.

Perhaps Thaksin made the supreme mistake, like all others, of leaving his army chief back home. He paid a heavy price for it, and still lives in political exile.

As the weeklong high-level segment of the General Assembly begins next week, a new generation of Arab leaders will be at the United Nations.

But these are heads of state and heads of government who succeeded authoritarian leaders who were ousted by revolts and insurrections during the “Ärab Spring” – in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen.

The line-up of Arab leaders expected at the United Nations includes President Moncef Marzouki of Tunisia who took power in December 2011 after Zine El Abdine Ben Ali fled the country; Mohamed Yousef el-Magariaf, president of Libya’s National Congress who took over after Muammar el- Gaddafi was killed in the October 2011 civil war; President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi of Yemen who succeeded Ali Abdullah Saleh who went into exile in February 2012; and President Mohammed Morsi of Egypt who took power from Hosni Mubarak who was ousted in February 2011.

Since all of them assumed power either after popular revolts on insurrections, the chances of these leaders being ousted when in New York seems remote.

At his press conference Wednesday, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told reporters he expects 123 heads of state and government – besides deputy prime ministers and foreign ministers – to attend the current 67th session of the General Assembly where the high-level debate is scheduled to begin Tuesday.

Besides the “deteriorating situation” in Syria, he said, the United Nations will be hosting a series of mini-summits and special meetings focusing on the emergency in the Sahel; progress in Somalia (whose new president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is also due here); the transitions in Myanmar and Yemen; instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and the relations between Sudan and the new neighbouring country of South Sudan.

“We will also discuss the threat of nuclear terrorism and press for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty,” he added.

But Samir Sanbar, a former U.N. assistant secretary-general and a longtime observer of Middle Eastern politics, is sceptical of the “new generation” of Arab leaders.

Asked for his political insight, Sanbar told IPS, “Whatever speeches are made at the General Assembly next week, there are certain facts on the ground.”

First, Arab Women and Youth who spearheaded the dynamic protests two years ago will argue that the so-called Arab Spring has been hijacked through a deal with Islamist movements mediated by two regional sub-contractors (no naming required), he pointed out.

Second, the new generation is new to governance but they are of the old generation; it is therefore the forces behind them that would matter- and they have not shown their hand yet, said Sanbar, who served under five different secretaries-general and is currently editor of an electronic newsletter titled U.N. Forum.

Third, he said, the rulers who had emerged after the Palestinian Nakbah of 1948 were military coup leaders who suppressed freedom ostensibly to liberate Palestine (“the outcome was no liberation and no freedom”).

And the new leaders are already attempting to control freedom, especially of women, the media and creative arts, under the guise of religion, he observed.

“We may end up again loosing freedom and distorting the holy message of religion,” Sanbar said.

Political rhetoric during confused times may tend to conceal more than reveal, he said, pointing out that as recent events show, “more of the same trouble is likely to continue”.

“God help the people – decent, honest dedicated – of that region who always end up paying the price,” declared Sanbar.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.

Growing Public Discontent with Turkish Syria Policy

Global News Blog / IPS

Jacques Couvas

ANKARA, Sep 21 (IPS) – Public approval of the Turkish government’s foreign policy has reached its lowest point – a mere 18 percent – in the past decade, according to a poll released here this week that showed only 18 percent of respondents said they favoured Ankara’s handling of the escalating sectarian violence in neighbouring Syria.The results did not come as a total surprise, as the popularity of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been in steady decline all year. But the position taken by the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan with respect to President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime has clearly exacerbated the growing discontent.

At the beginning of Syria’s internal conflict some 19 months ago, Erdogan and his influential foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, opposed any foreign intervention. Both men, as well as Turkey’s intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, made numerous trips to Damascus early in the crisis to try to persuade Assad to deal with the mushrooming opposition with compromise, rather than brutal repression.

At the time, Ankara had no interest in regime change. It had taken nearly two decades to achieve a rapprochement with Damascus, an effort sealed by the signing in 2009 of 50 bilateral commercial and security accords aimed at boosting Turkey’s exports to Syria, the Arab beachhead for Davutoglu’s “Zero Problems with Neighbours” policy, to five billion dollars a year by 2012.

But by mid-2011, Erdogan had turned against Assad, demanding that he step down as part of any resolution of an increasingly violent civil conflict.

Encouraged by the U.S., as well as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which have together invested massively in Turkey since the AKP came to power in 2002 and have pledged to invest more than 12 billion dollars more this year, Ankara began providing refuge and support to the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), organisations composed of opposition figures and defectors from the Assad regime and army.

Erdogan’s exhortations, as well as Turkey’s backing for the two rebel groups, naturally antagonised Damascus; it also cooled off Ankara’s previously good relations wth Assad’s other foreign backers, notably Iran, Iraq, Russia, and China.

Their unhappiness has been manifested in a variety of ways. Diplomatic entente with Tehran and a booming trade with Baghdad have deteriorated, while Moscow and Beijing have discreetly advised Erdogan to drop any notions he may entertain of armed intervention to overthrow Assad.

Turkey’s opposition, represented mainly by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), was initially mildly critical of the AKP’s Syria policy. Committed to Kemal Ataturk’s doctrine of “Peace at Home, Peace in the World,” it wanted Ankara to remain neutral in the conflict next door.

Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and of the CHP, believed that the country’s territorial integrity would be preserved, so long as it stayed out of international conflicts.

Events since June, notably the growing flood of refugees seeking safe haven in Turkey and the dramatic intensification of hostilities between the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), have made the Turkish opposition more assertive.

The PKK, considered a terrorist organisation by the U.S. and the European Union (EU), has been fighting the central government for most of the past 28 years. Over that time, the insurgency and Ankara’s efforts to defeat it have claimed some 40,000 lives, most of them civilians.

In the first 15 years of the conflict, at least 3,000 villages in the predominantly Kurdish southeastern part of the country were destroyed, while an estimated three million people were displaced.

With a combined population of about 30 million across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Kurds – and their long-held dreams of self-determination – have long represented a threat to the four countries’ central governments. Of the four, Turkey has the largest Kurdish population – about half of the total.

In recent months, Erdogan and Davutoglu have accused Damascus, and to a lesser degree, Tehran, of providing refuge and material support to the PKK, although they have yet to produce hard evidence.

There is nonetheless a general suspicion, exploited by the CHP, that the PKK’s increased effectiveness – ambushes of Turkish soldiers and police have become an almost weekly occurrence, and some 700 people have been killed in the last 14 months – is directly related to the situation in Syria, including the de facto abandonment by the Assad regime of Kurdish areas along the Turkish border to local Kurdish militias, some of which have had close ties to the PKK.

According to the CHP, Erdogan’s bet on Assad’s swift demise was a strategic mistake. “The AKP’s policy on Syria has fully collapsed,” according to Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the CHP’s chief. “It is a short-sighted policy …influenced by other countries policies.”

Independent analysts say these attacks are taking their toll and may yet force in a shift by the government.

“We will probably see a change in policy in the next months, especially if Assad or his regime appears to be hanging on,” wrote Semih Idiz, diplomatic editor of Hurriyet. “It will manifest itself with more ecumenical initiatives that are more balanced and less one-sided."

For his part, Erdogan has angrily rejected criticism of Syria policy, particularly by the CHP which he has begun labeling Turkey’s Ba’athist party, the name of Syria’s ruling party.

But, even among the AKP’s supporters, reservations about Erdogan’s policy have been growing.

“The Turkish government decided to support the opposition forces and gave up its ‘no problem with neighbours’ policy, replacing it with a ‘better relations with future neighbours’ policy, according to Kerim Balci, a prominent columnist for Zaman, Turkey’s largest circulation daily newspaper which has generally backed the AKP.

“This was a kind of gamble: if the opposition forces win in Syria, Turkey will be a big winner; but if they lose, or the chaos there continues into the winter, Turkey will lose much,” Balci went on in an email exchange with IPS.

“Turkish policy towards Syria is 100-percent legitimate but not that very well-calculated. Turkey should have kept its previous ‘on-good-term-with-all-sides-of-the-conflict’ policy towards Syrian regime and opposition groups and third parties related to the conflict.”

“On the other hand the Turkish prime minister is quite a pragmatic man. The minute he realises he is hurting his own political career, he will make a U-turn,” added Balci, who is also the editor-in-chief of Turkish Review, a foreign policy journal.

*Jim Lobe contributed to this article.

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.

Saving Libya From its Saviours

Global News Blog / IPS

Rebecca Murray

TRIPOLI, Sep 21 (IPS) – The dark rain clouds and circling military helicopter accentuated the mood of the small, sombre crowd gathered in Tripoli’s Martyr’s Square to commemorate Libya’s dead heroes.The quiet assembly was in stark contrast to the euphoric Feb. 17 rally on the same spot marking the one-year anniversary of the uprising against the Gaddafi regime. Then thousands of Libyans – some holding framed pictures of ‘martyred’ loved ones – thronged the downtown sidewalks and expressed optimism for a future of democracy, prosperity and peace.

That optimism has been replaced by anxiety. The killing of U.S. ambassador Christopher Stevens in Benghazi has highlighted the dangers posed by a proliferation of armed groups since the revolution. Many are part of the loose-knit, undertrained government auxiliary forces that seem to act with impunity throughout Libya, and fuel the anxious public perception that the government is too weak to rein them in.

The government’s call for citizens to voluntarily hand in their weapons is now pushed back to the end of September because of security concerns. Prime Minister Mustafa Abu Shugar has proposed giving cash for weapons.

After fighting in the revolution and receiving three weeks formal training, Rami Ezzadine Tajari, 22, and Mohammed Nagy, 19, wearing mismatched military uniforms and carrying battered AK47s, are part of the Ministry of Interior’s sprawling auxiliary force, the Supreme Security Council (SSC).

The SSC, like the Ministry of Defence’s affiliated Shield of Libya brigades, is a collection of armed groups operating across Libya under the interior ministry’s loose control.

“A lot of people came to hand in their weapons,” says Tajari. “We told them to bring them back on the 29th. After that, citizens will be forbidden to carry them.”

Human rights lawyer Salah Marghani, commended by Human Rights Watch for his advocacy work with detainees under the Gaddafi regime, is outraged by the buy-back weapons scheme. “It will create a lucrative trade of arms for profit and won’t take many arms off the street,” he says. “What we need to get rid of is the heavy weapons.”

Marghani divides Libya’s armed groups operating in the government security vacuum into five categories. He explains that three are “easy to deal with”: former revolutionary fighters who believe their sole duty is to protect citizens and will voluntarily disarm; those who guard national interests motivated by a mix of doing public good and making profit; and those who benefit exclusively from small economic kickbacks.

“The remaining two categories are the dangerous ones,” says Marghani. These are ex-convicts who commit violent crimes, including armed robbery and drug dealing, or groups of “phantom-like” fighters that operate under a banner of Gaddafi loyalists or Islamist extremism.

In light of the Benghazi attack, he describes Libyans as feeling a collective ‘shame’. “They are scared right now,” he adds. “They don’t want their country to be another Somalia with warlords.”

An International Crisis Group (ICG) analysis of Libya’s armed groups sheds light on the new government’s complex challenge.

ICG states that the Gaddafi regime’s ‘divide-and-rule’ policy manipulated communities with a draconian security apparatus and selective disbursal of Libya’s rich resources.

“Once the lid was removed, there was every reason to fear a free-for-all, as the myriad of armed groups that proliferated during the rebellion sought material advantage, political influence or, more simply, revenge,” says the report. “This was all the more so given the security vacuum produced by the regime’s precipitous fall.”

Bill Lawrence, ICG’s North Africa analyst, in an interview with IPS says that Salafist leaders he has met blame rogue elements for the Benghazi attack. “Salafists who are in general skeptical of the political transition in Libya in some cases – not in every case – are definitely disassociating themselves from this act of violence, and condemning both the assassination and the film.”

Some Libyans voice concerns that the U.S. drones, intelligence and military personnel in Libyan territory since the ambassador’s death might be here to stay.

Sami Khaskusha, professor of international relations, is a driving force on Tripoli University campus. An active member of the civil resistance against Gaddafi, he energetically organised a wide range of civil society discussions after the capital’s liberation under an ambitious banner: ‘Tripoli University’s programme for rebuilding Libya’.

“Suddenly we turned the university into a huge workshop,” Khaskusha remembers. “There was a lot of euphoria and enthusiasm then.”

But he says the mood changed and activities were curtailed when the transitional government’s more traditional, conservative mindset inherited power at the ministries.

“At that same time every thug took over offices and declared himself to be a military brigade. They submitted lists to the defence and interior ministries and demanded money and cars, and extorted businesses,” Khaskusha says.

“The Ministry of Interior is now run by the militia rather than the opposite. The ministry gave armed groups the legitimacy to arrest, interrogate, and secure banks, government offices and embassies in the absence of state power.”

An escalation of crime with impunity, tribal clashes and intolerant attacks against religious sites and non-governmental organisations are contributing to an atmosphere of instability and fear.

Salah Marghani is working against this. In light of torture in detention centres documented by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, he educates armed groups – including former prisoners now supervising jails – to adhere to human rights protocols.

“In one incident, I asked a military brigade if they torture inmates. One man said: ‘No we don’t, we only do ‘falaqa’ (beating prisoners’ feet). What struck me was he didn’t comprehend this is wrong,” sighs Marghani.

“I think it will take ten to 15 years for people to understand the role of democracy and civil society,” Khaskusha says. “We need to practise a peaceful struggle of ideas, culture of tolerance and acceptance of ‘the other’. Now when we disagree, we run to our weapons.”

All rights reserved, IPS – Inter Press Service, 2012.

This article may not be republished, broadcast, framed, or redistributed without the written permission of IPS – Inter Press Service. Republication of this material without permission from IPS, the copyright holder, constitutes a violation of United States and international copyright laws and may result in legal action.